Thursday, August 9, 2018

A good call on Global Strategists about Pakistan

A good call on Global Strategists about Pakistan

As democracy takes root in Pakistan, a new world equilibrium will be birthing for Muslims. If Imran Khan does it right, it would be a shining example of Islamic Democracy and I hope he does not resort to dictating Islam, Islam is about free will. He needs to revoke the uncivilized laws passed by the dictator and the opportunists. He has to earn the respect among the community of nations as a nation that  respects the rights of minorities and the weak  and bring Pakistan to reflect the will of her people, who are moderate, caring and civilized. 

A majority of the Muslim-run nations have dictators or monarchs. They don't trust the people to govern among themselves.   

Redeeming Pakistan is one of the blogs I maintain among the Blogs about India, Israel-Palestine, and others. 

My focus remains on continually developing the Center for Pluralism, thanks to everyone, we have earned a big name on Pluralism in religion, politics, society, culture, and workplace with our work. Our think tank was established in 2001 and the research work continues there as my contribution to my religion.
Mike Ghouse
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A call from Bob Crane, former US Ambassador
Global strategists of the world unite!

       For anyone concerned about the future of human civilization, pasted below is the best writing on foreign policy and especially on Central Asia since Owen Lattimore's book, Pivot of Asia, which I practically memorized in 1947 in preparation for a trip as a manure-shoveler on a United Nations boat transporting cattle to a starving China.  

       This article, entitled "Pakistan Elections: May Be Good News for Pakistan, but Not for U.S", is by Graham Fuller, who used to be head of National Intelligence Estimates in the CIA when I was on loan from the State Department as Deputy Director of the new Office of Product Improvement more than forty years ago in the office of the Director of Central Intelligence, James Schlesinger.

       Graham has been an astute student of the global discord that has resulted from American support of European colonialism in Southwest and Central Asia after the Europeans essentially withdrew except as spectators, to be followed perhaps eventually by the Americans in pursuit of Donald Trump's electioneering promise in 2016 to abandon the catastrophic dream of "nation-building".  This militantly secularistic project has been designed to eliminate organic nations and maintain stability in the process through local dictators and whatever foreign military support may be necessary.  This, by the way, was the precise opposite of the policy essentially of con-federalism and national autonomy practiced successfully by the Ottoman Empire for many centuries.

       Now that Imran Khan has won in the peaceful shift in Pakistan's governing political parties, only the second one in 71 years, Central Asia is a new ballgame, including even the paradigmatic shift of Afghanistan from South Asia to Central Asia.  The new player, Pushtunistan, which the British in 1947 split between Pakistan and the artificial country of Afghanistan, is now acknowledged as a central player.  Indeed, it may offer the only hope for the end of the 17-year American war to ruthlessly subjugate the Pushtuns, who until today were known in American circles as the radical Taliban.  

       The leadership of the Pushtun was educated by the Saudis as orphans from the war during the 1980s against the Soviets.  Today, when the younger generation of the Pushtun liberate new areas, the first thing they do is to open girls schools and invite United Nations NGOs to help them join the modern world while maintaining the best of their centuries-long heritage, best epitomized by Abdul Ghaffar Khan, a non-violent soldier of Islam, whom Mahatma Gandhi said was his essential model and inspiration for the liberation of India from British occupation (see

       The only important point not mentioned by Graham Fuller in his think-piece below is the fact that President Bush violated all the laws of the "just war doctrine" when he refused the Taliban's offer to surrender Osama Bin Laden after 9/11 for trial in the third country of their mutual choice.  President Bush replied, "I want Osama bin Laden dead or alive".  

       Bush made his second most egregious error when he bombed Baghdad after the Pope sent his legate to advise President Bush in early March 2003, that under the existing circumstances an American invasion of Iraq would violate every one of the doctrine's seven conditions and constitute a war crime.

       The domestic and global repercussions of Imran Khan's dramatically populist victory in Pakistan's recent presidential election on July 26, 2018, are spelled out in detail by Graham Fuller below.  The latest development reportedly is that Washington yesterday put President Imran Khan's closest advisor, on the American "no-fly" list, perhaps in part because President Khan was born in the middle of Pushtunistan and accordingly has been a populist opponent of America's entire strategy against terrorism.  America's terrorist counter-terrorism has been a major cause of global terrorism, together with the growing wealth gap within and among countries caused by a defective system of money, credit, and banking, and may continue to do so in the decades ahead unless the militaristic paradigm of Neo-Con thought is replaced by what the brilliant Zbigniew Brzezinski, head of the National Security Council in the White House under President Jimmy Carter during the late Soviet Communist era, introduced successfully as "peaceful engagement". 

       For the best deep background perspective on a post-Neo-Con foreign policy, see the several books by Douglas M. Johnston, Jr., who once was Executive Director of the world's most powerful foreign policy think-tank, the Center for Strategic and International Studies.  His latest book, published by Praeger in 2011, is entitled Religion, Terror, and Error: U.S. Foreign Policy and the Challenge of Spiritual Engagement, 283 pages.

       The key to ultimate success in policy-making is networking among like-minded people.  Such a networking strategy is the opposite of the common concept and practice among Muslims that too often has focused internally and negatively against others, following the model of Ibn Khaldun's bad asabiya, whereby one often derives one's own identity by looking down on others.  The opposite is pride in the best of one's own community as a source of identity and as an essential means to appreciate the good in other persons and communities, so that one can focus outwardly and constructively in cooperation with other communities and nations in everyone's best interests, in accordance with the Qur'an's emphasis on the good asabiyah.  

       The broader purpose of any networking project should be to help receptive members of these think-tanks cooperate in addressing the ultimate source of truth and purpose in every person's life (the discipline of ontology), in order to develop this epistemologically into a universal jurisprudence of responsibilities and derivative human rights, and then apply this axiologically to reform the world in practice, including its institutions, in pursuit of the wisdom in Mica 6:8 as the basis for compassionate justice:

What does
the Lord require
of you? but to do


and to love


and to walk
humbly with your

Pakistan Elections—Maybe Good News for Pakistan, But Not for U.S.

Pakistan Elections—Maybe Good News for Pakistan, But Not For US
Graham E. Fuller (
8 August 2018
A bold new political face has come to power in the recent Pakistani elections, possibly offering the US a new opportunity in that country. Sadly the opportunity will likely be squandered—again. There’s something about Pakistani and US interests that seem doomed to collision course—mainly because Pakistan’s national interests are rarely what the US thinks they should be. 
Pakistanis themselves can be pleased the country has just experienced for only the second time in its history a democratic electoral transition from one political party to another. Over long decades democratically-elected governments have been routinely dethroned by the all-powerful Pakistani military-dominated intelligence service ISI. 
A key problem is that American interests in Pakistan have had little to do with Pakistan itself, but have been the function of other American interests—China, fighting the Soviet Union, al-Qaeda, and trying to win an ongoing—and losing—17-year US war in Afghanistan. Once about eliminating al-Qaeda, Washington today hopes the war in Afghanistan will eliminate the often violent fundamentalist Pashtun movement (Taliban) and enable the US to impose its strategic agenda upon Afghanistan. And over decades the US has alternately cajoled but mostly threatened Pakistan to do US bidding in Afghanistan. (A former Deputy Secretary of the Pentagon, in the months after 9/11, threatened to “bomb Pakistan back to the Stone Age” if it didn’t fully get on board and support the new US invasion of Afghanistan.)
In an earlier decade, after the USSR invaded Afghanistan in 1979 to prop up a failing Afghan communist regime, the US had recruited the Pakistani government to take the lead in organizing a new anti-Soviet “jihad” through supporting new mujahedin groups in Afghanistan. It was a fateful moment: this anti-Soviet jihad represented the first time that Islamist warriors, recruited from around the world in a joint US-Saudi-Pakistani strategy, became a powerful battle-hardened jihadi force that would later go on to fight new wars in the Middle East—and against US interests. As one of the mujahideen told me at the time, they had “defeated a superpower”—the USSR—and driven Soviet troops out of Afghanistan. What would be the implications for the future? 
Then, after 9/11, the US invaded Afghanistan in order to overthrow the ruling Taliban—who had taken over the country and restored order after a devastating. nine-year Afghan civil war following the Soviet withdrawal. The Taliban actually represent a home-grown movement—they had no interest in international terrorism.  But they made one disastrous mistake: they allowed Osama Bin Laden to stay on in Afghanistan after he had played a small role in supporting the Taliban in achieving power in 1996. The US invasion ensued.
The thing to be remembered is that the Taliban are primarily a Pashtun movement; Pashtuns constitute the single largest ethnic group in multi-ethnic Afghanistan and have traditionally dominated national Afghan politics over several hundred years. While unquestionably following a kind of Wahhabi-style Islamic rule, they also represent a powerful Pashtun ethnic impulse. Many Afghan Pashtuns dislike the Taliban but they generally also wish to see Pashtuns maintain power in Afghanistan. This same ethnic issue matters a lot when it comes to Pakistan. 
The stated US agenda in Afghanistan now is to prevent the Taliban, who are conducting a fairly successful insurgency against the US-backed government in Kabul, from coming to power. Yet there is no way the Taliban can be decisively defeated, while the US may yet opt to move into its third decade of war there in trying to keep them out of power. While Taliban theology and policies are fairly Wahhabi in character, is it worth the longest war in American history to struggle on to keep them out? (There are a few encouraging signs that the US may be actually trying to reach some negotiated back-door deal with the Taliban for future power-sharing, but the Taliban may just decide to wait the US out.) What Washington doesn’t talk about is its long, strategic ambition to maintain military bases in Afghanistan, right in the heart of Central Asia in close proximity to Russia and China—very much out of the US Cold War playbook. But is it worth this costly and losing game?
Here’s where Pakistan comes in. In the Pak-Afghan border region there are twice as many Pashtuns living in Pakistan as there are in Afghanistan. They represent a powerful force in Pakistani politics—and that’s where Imran Khan, Pakistan’s new president from the heart of Pashtun territory, also comes in. 
Bottom line: the US has consistently attempted to enlist Pakistan into rescuing America’s losing war in Afghanistan; a key US demand has been for the Pakistanis to sever ties between Pakistani and Afghan Taliban movements and crush all radical Islamist groups in the border region. There is no doubt Pakistan has indeed helped the Afghan Taliban (Pashtuns) to fight on in Afghanistan. Pakistan has a deep interest, domestic and foreign, in keeping close ties with all Pashtuns, Taliban or not. (The Pakistani Taliban movement is more violent than the Afghan one but cannot be easily crushed —perhaps only tamed—even by the Pakistani government.)
And the power base of Pakistan’s new president Imran Khan lies precisely in this Pashtun region of the country. He will not likely agree to any policy pressures from the US to crush Taliban cross-border ties; he favors a strong Pashtun/Taliban presence in any Afghan government. Imran Khan has also been outspokenly critical of the US role in Pakistan and he will guard Pakistani sovereignty more jealously than his predecessors.
And then there are geopolitics with India. Already hugely outweighed and outgunned by a huge and powerful Indian state on Pakistan’s eastern border, Pakistan’s geopolitics dictate that it can never allow its geographically narrow state to be simultaneously threatened by a pro-Indian government on Pakistan’s western border in Afghanistan. Yet India has hugely invested—financially, politically and in terms of intelligence presence in Afghanistan with US blessing—perceived by Islamabad as deadly geopolitical threat. Pakistan will do all it can to ensure that Afghanistan does not fall under Indian political domination. That also means deep involvement in Afghan Pashtun politics (that include Taliban).
The US has consistently run roughshod over Pakistani sovereignty throughout its war in Afghanistan, thereby generating strong anti-US feelings in Pakistan. (My first novel: “Breaking Faith: An American’s Crisis of Conscience in Pakistan,” deals  heavily with these issues, including the CIA and American military presence in Pakistan, as well as the complicated range of Pakistani Islamist movements at the human level of a Pakistani family.)
And finally we  have the ever-growing China factor. Pakistan has long been China’s closest ally and considers Beijing to be an “all-weather friend”— in pointed distinction to perceived US opportunism in Pakistan. Both Pakistan and Afghanistan are now integral elements in China’s sweeping new economic and infrastructural Eurasian development plan “One Bridge One Road.”  (Iran too, incidentally, is linked into the same Chinese vision.) There is no way Pakistan will ever choose close ties with Washington over ties with China, for a dozen good reasons, including shared mutual distrust of India. 
In short, Imran Khan may well bring some fresh air into Pakistani politics, including a declared willingness to clamp down on the country’s rampant corruption. The powerful Pakistan military also supports him. It is hard to imagine how the US will not continue to lose ever more traction in the Pakistan-Afghan morass short of undertaking a major US shift away from its military-driven foreign policy. That US policy and style seems to tally ever less with the interests of most states of the region.
Graham E. Fuller is a former senior CIA official, author of numerous books on the Muslim World; his latest book is BEAR, a novel of the Great Bear Rainforest and Eco-Terrorism. (Amazon, Kindle)

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Mike Ghouse
Center for Pluralism
Washington, DC
(214) 325-1916

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